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Tibetan self-immolations as counter-securitization:  interdiscursivity, identity and 
emergency measures 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that the Tibetan self-immolations constitute a form of counter-securitization 
to China’s securitization of the 2008 Tibetan uprising. Theoretically, it argues that 
securitization theory (1) is too focused on the intra-unit interaction between securitizing elites 
and audiences; (2) leaves the inter-unit dynamics underdeveloped and (3) fails to recognize the 
securitised ‘other’ as an audience. This article theorises the linkage between unit-level and 
inter-unit processes by exploiting three concepts: inter-discursivity, identity and emergency 
measures. Contrary to existing theories, it shows that even unsuccessful securitizing moves can 
set off counter-securitizations thanks to audience-overlap and inter-discursivity. The Sino-
Tibetan interactions around the Tibetan self-immolations uphold these theoretical positions. 
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Tibetan self-immolations as counter-securitization:  interdiscursivity, identity and 
emergency measures 
 
143 Tibetans have self-immolated in Tibet since February 2009 to protest Chinese rule over 
their homeland. What explains their turn to such a painful form of resistance, which is at once 
a form of communication as well as a dramatic political act? To be sure, the self-immolations 
have been interpreted in multiple ways as exemplified by special issues in two academic 
journals.1 This article posits the self-immolations as counter-securitization, a specific form of 
resistance against China’s securitization of the 2008 uprising and the decades-long general 
condition of securitization by the Chinese Party-state. To advance these points, the theory of 
securitization is developed and deployed here. 
How does an issue become a ‘security’ issue in international relations (IR)? What is the 
mechanism through which it maintains that status? For those unsatisfied with mainstream 
theories in answering these questions, securitization has become the dominant theory ever since 
its presentation by the Copenhagen School (CS).2 However, CS’s securitization has met 
considerable critical attention over the years. This article argues that in the current readings, 
securitization theory is problematic in three crucial and related senses. First, it fails to recognise 
that human communities can react to securitization. This has implications for CS’ narrow 
conception of the ‘audience’. Second, securitization is too focused on the unit-level3 interaction 
between securitizing elites and audiences. Third, the inter-unit effects of securitization remain 
under-theorised. Securitization is therefore a good theory of domestic/intra-group security 
politics, but underdeveloped as a theory of international security. To address these problems, 
this article offers a two-level reconceptualization of securitization. The Tibetan self-
immolations will demonstrate the need to incorporate the securitised ‘other’ in the ‘audience’ 
and  to develop the interactive dynamics of securitization and counter-securitization.  
These empirical and theoretical objectives are pursued in six sections. The first section 
provides an overview of CS’ theory and its critiques. The second and third sections develop 
my own critique that reveals underdevelopment of the inter-unit level of analysis. 
Securitization is reconceptualised to assign greater importance to securitizing moves, even if 
unsuccessful, and ‘audience’ overlap. We end up with a two-level theoretical framework 
linking the unit-level and inter-unit dynamics. The fourth section commences the empirical 
analysis by examining China’s securitization of the 2008 uprising in Tibet. The fifth section 
analyses the self-immolations as a Tibetan counter-securitization using final statements left 
behind by self-immolators. It will be shown that while the Chinese securitization is motivated 
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principally by sovereignty and regime-security concerns, the Tibetan counter-securitization is 
driven chiefly by their identity insecurity. Readers who are not theoretically inclined can rely 
upon the above summary to skip straight to page 10 for the empirical analysis of the self-
immolations. 
 
Securitization and its critiques 
The most comprehensive expression of CS’ securitization is contained in Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis.4 It is centred upon the application of the concepts of ‘speech act.’5 
CS argued that security is a speech act; uttering security elevates a particular issue or 
development from ‘normal’ to the ‘special’ politics of security. As Wæver argued, ‘the 
utterance itself is the act…. By uttering “security”, a state-representative moves a particular 
development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means 
necessary to block it.’6 The security speech act is productive of a ‘a new social order.’7 While 
theoretically any issue or development can be securitized, CS privileges state-actors and 
pressure groups as securitizing actors.8 CS also assigns an important role to the audience whose 
acceptance is critical for success. It also identifies three ‘facilitating’ or ‘felicity’ conditions 
which influence the success or failure of securitization: the ‘internal’ grammar of security 
(consisting of existential threats and emergency measures) and the ‘external’ context (social 
positions of the securitizing actors and the nature of the threat).9 The speech act, the securitizing 
actor and the audience, and the three facilitating conditions constitute the basic triology of CS’ 
theory.10 While CS’ version of the securitization is fundamentally a discursive theory, it also 
claims an ‘inter-subjective and socially constructed’ label.11 
Reflecting its success, securitization has been the subject of sustained critique and 
development. One set of theoretical criticism, coming mainly from the sociological strand of 
securitization scholars,  charges CS of privileging speech and the speech act and ignoring other 
forms of political communication and securitization.12 Another set of theoretical critique 
concern the internal contradictions, tensions and ambiguities inherent in CS’ theory.13 
Considerable attention has always been focused on reframing the character and role of the 
audience.14 Others point towards the normative and selection biases.15 Within the existing 
intra-unit parameters, securitization has now become a sophisticated theory. Ironically, this is 
also its main weakness. It is a useful theory of intra-unit security politics, but it ignores the 
interactive dynamics across units. This is damaging to the claim of securitization as a theory 
of ‘international security’. It captures the inter-subjectivity within the unit, but misses the core 
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concern of ‘International Security’—inter-subjectivity at the inter-unit level. The following 
sections take this critique further.   
 
 
Privileging unit-level politics, under-theorising inter-unit dynamics 
Barring two recent works discussed below, securitization starts and ends with the interaction 
between securitising actors and audiences within given units. The success or failure of 
securitization is a function of the balance of socio-discursive power between the actor and the 
audience, the performative power of the text and the socio-political context. The implications 
on the putative threats and targets of securitization are under-examined. As Vuori notes, ‘The 
“targets” of securitization, the claimed threats presented in the performatives, are left out of 
most analysis.’16 CS does broach this topic briefly though. Embedding securitization into the 
existing concept of security complexes, CS writes: 
 
The investigation [of the patterns of security connectedness] proceeds in three steps: (1) Is the issue 
securitized successfully by any actors? (2) If yes, track the links and interactions from this 
instance—how does the security action in this case impinge on the security of others, and where 
does this then echo significantly? (3) These chains can then be collected as a cluster of 
interconnected security concerns.17  
 
Buzan and Waever reproduces this formulation to demonstrate the empirical possibility of 
Regional Security Complexes (RSCs).18 However, they do not theorise the interactive 
dynamics beyond these instructional statements. 
Some problems arise out of these instructions. First, there is the problematic assumption 
that only successful securitizations have inter-unit consequences. Does this mean that only 
‘emergency’ or ‘extra-ordinary’ steps carry implications for inter-unit ‘chains’ of 
securitization? This elides from security analysis an entire class of speech acts that do not cross 
the ‘exceptional’ threshold of success. In light of the informatized global reality, it is 
unsustainable to maintain that discourses or speech acts representing others as ‘threats’ could 
have performative power within units, but not across inter-unit relations. Focused as they are 
on bureaucratic practices, routines, policy instruments and emotions, the sociological theorists 
of securitization ignore discursive securitization entirely.19 This research argues that 
securitising moves that fail to graduate to emergency measures could still set off counter-
securitization as a result of inter-discursivity. 
From these reflections, another critique of CS’ residual traditionalism is possible. Its 
neglect of failed securitizations in their effort to connect securitization to regional security 
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complexes implicitly privileges material and physical acts (emergency steps) and underplays 
the power of language even as they claim to provide a theory based on speech and speech acts. 
This arises from CS’ illocutionary understanding of speech acts as opposed to a perlocutionary 
interpretation. When the perlocutionary understanding is dominant as in Balzacq’s works, it 
applies only to intended and unintended intra-unit consequences, not across units. Only actual 
security measures adopted after successful securitization are seen as having ‘links and 
interactions’ with the security of other units. Even then, CS neither provides a theory to ‘track 
the [cross-unit] links and interactions’ nor do they conceptualise the security ‘echo’ to explore 
the boomerang effect on the unit which initiated the ‘chain-reaction’ in the first instance.  
Vuori and Stritzel and Chang came closest to unpacking the inter-unit/cross-unit 
dynamics of securitization.20 Vuori uses the conflict between the Chinese Party-State and the 
banned Falun Gong sect to reveal the dynamics of ‘counter-securitization’: ‘How do 
securitizing moves affect the inter-unit relations of securitizing actors and the claimed threats 
present in securitization moves?’21 Employing the concept of ‘identity frames,’ Vuori 
demonstrates that the Party-State’s relentless securitization of Falun Gong and its leader, Li 
Hongzhi, drove the sect first to desecuritize and then to counter-securitize the Communist Party 
and President Jiang Zemin. Thus he escapes the unit-level straitjacket.  
However, despite Vuori’s aspiration to develop the inter-unit dimension of 
securitization, his framework is tailored for a specific kind of vertical competition between 
‘repressive’ states and disgruntled social movements. This calls into question its broader 
application on inter-unit and mixed-unit (e.g. US-Al-Qaeda or NATO-Taliban conflicts) 
contexts. Vuori’s privileging of the illocutionary speech acts sits uncomfortably with his 
objective of examining effects across units, for which a perlocutionary understanding is more 
suitable. 
Finally, Vuori’s treatment of desecuritization as resistance is problematic on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. In James Scott’s theory of ‘voice under domination,’ the ‘art 
of political disguise’ is central to the ‘everyday forms of resistance’ waged by subordinate 
groups.22 His ‘weapons of the weak’ in political resistance have the same objectives as their 
more direct and open alternatives, to undermine and neutralise the adversary, not different goals 
as securitization and desecuritization entail.23 Balzacq is explicit in differentiating 
desecuritization from resistance. Noting that resistance involves deliberate application of 
‘power’ and that desecuritization can be achieved ‘without tactical or strategic intention’ or use 
of power, Balzacq argues that ‘[t]o resist is to deliver a counter-force; to desecuritize is [simply] 
not do securitize in reverse.’24 Vuori’s description of Falun Gong’s initial articulations as 
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desecuritization is empirically problematic. First, the official repression of Falun Gong began 
only when over 10, 000 Falun Gong adherents gathered in Tiananmen Square to protest a 
critical article in a Tianjin magazine.25 Since there was no repression before that, there was no 
resistance against the Chinese government. Many of Li Hongzhi’s books were in fact  published 
by official publication houses and the state media carried both positive and negative coverage 
of the sect between 1996 and 1999. Furthermore, his sect enjoyed support from sections of the 
power elite. What was remarkable however is Falun Gong’s ‘relentless counterattack’ against 
any negative media coverage including ‘harassing individual editors and reporters’.26 Once the 
official campaign of repression began, Falun Gong  just as relentlessly counter-securitized the 
CCP and Jiang Zemin as evil and traitorous forces. Li Hongzhi’s protestations of ‘not going 
political’ or not having political ambitions was a continuation of his long-standing desire to 
stay apolitical for financial and other organisational interests, not a new tactic in his post-1999 
‘desecuritization’ efforts.27 While securitization can be a form of resistance,28 desecuritization 
cannot be seen as resistance as there is no use of  ‘counter-force’.  
 Stritzel and Chang are more precise in interrogating the relationship between resistance 
and counter-securitization.29 They conceptualise counter-securitization as a ‘specific form of 
resistance against the securitization process that takes the linguistically regulated form of a 
securitizing speech act’.30 Using the post-9/11 NATO-Taliban war in Afghanistan, Stritzel and 
Chang depict securitization and counter-securitization as elements in an interactive ‘political 
game constituted by moves and counter-moves in a continuous struggle for authority and 
legitimacy’.31 Counter-securitization is thus a particular expression of resistance: 
We thus define counter-securitizing moves resisting crucial elements of the securitization process 
for the purposes of this article narrowly and rather technically as indeed counter-securitizing in the 
sense that counter-securitizing moves also follow the ideal-type of the grammar of securitizing 
speech acts of claim, warning, directive (typically demand)….32 
 
While this is an important conceptualisation of counter-securitization, it leaves a number of 
questions unanswered.  
First, it does not tell us why some securitizations provoke counter-securitizations and 
others do not. Second, Stritzel and Chang makes a conscious decision to focus on the 
‘communicative situation of contemporary war’ because, they believe, securitization in this 
situation becomes ‘iterative and interactive’ and as such lends itself more to counter-
securitization. Although this is a significant demonstration of the power of securitization to 
engage with ‘hard’ military security issues, this article shows that non-traditional security 
issues are just as interactive and open to counter-securitization. Third, in concentrating on the 
‘implementation stage’, the point when the emergency measures are activated after acceptance 
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by the audience, Stritzel and Chang reproduces the problem identified above of completely 
ignoring the performative power of language before the implementation phase.  
 
 
Inter-Unit Securitization 
By addressing the above critiques, this article develops a two-level theory of inter-unit 
securitization. This article links the unit-level dimension of securitization to the inter-unit level 
through three concepts: inter-discursivity, its co-production of identity, and emergency 
measures.  
 
Inter-discursivity and co-production of identity 
While the concept of discourse has strongly influenced critical IR theory, inter-discursivity has 
largely escaped the notice of most scholars. Judith Butler explicates inter-discursivity thus: ‘As 
historically specific organizations of language, discourses present themselves in the plural, 
coexisting within temporal frames, and instituting unpredictable and inadvertent convergences 
from which specific modalities of discursive possibilities are engendered’ (emphasis added).33 
Inter-discursivity means interconnections between two or more apparently discrete, across time 
and space, discourse.34 These interconnections are productive of new discourses. While 
existing notions of inter-discursitivity emphasise overlap or ‘convergence’ between discourses, 
a more constructivist understanding is possible whereby inter-discursivity involves mutually 
constitutive relationships between apparently separate discourses. In the process, identities and 
alterities are also reinforced. ‘[H]ow we discursively represent something also determines how 
we act toward it and hence what it will be’ (emphasis added).35 
Elisabeth Le’s study of Russian and Western media coverage of each other buttress the 
concept of inter-discursivity:  
 Anti-Russian, anti-western: these qualifiers have often surfaced in the discourse of Russia and the 
West about each other, as different “anti-” have also frequently appeared in other relations. This 
“anti-Other rhetoric” is hazardous, particularly when it finds a place in the editorials of renowned 
newspapers, because it can eventually develop into a spiral of distrust, dislike and sometimes hate 
that exacerbates difficulties and helps them escalate into a conflict that is more than just discursive.36 
 
Although inter-discursivity is conceptually underdeveloped, there is ample empirical evidence 
of its existence.37  
For instance, the mutually vilifying dynamic between the ‘China Threat’ thesis in parts 
of the US media and anti-Americanism in Chinese intelligentsia illustrate inter-discursivity 
very well. The Washington Post journalist Bill Gertz was at the forefront of the American 
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discourse of the China threat. He wrote that ‘[t]he true nature of Chinese communism’ is the 
same as any authoritarian regime: ‘military aggression’.38 Accusing the Clinton Administration 
of appeasement, Gertz called for containment policies targeting China.39 The Chinese anti-
America discourse is represented by tracts such as China Can Say No and The Plot to Demonize 
China and spin-offs.40 These mutually vilifying and securitizing discourses feed off each other 
and shape identities. Gries reveals the discursive co-constitution of identities most eloquently: 
Like all identities, Chinese and American identities are dynamic, evolving in part through their 
mutual interactions…. It is no coincidence that one of the very ugliest of China’s anti-American 
diatribes, 1997’s The Plot to Demonize China, focuses on real and imagined anti-China schemers 
in the Western press…. Chinese nationalists pay close attention to Gertz and other American China 
bashers. Accordingly, Gertz and others like him have a disproportionate impact on the shape and 
evolution of Chinese nationalism.41 
 
Similarly, Johnston cautions us: 
 “Talk” is consequential for both interstate and intra-state politics during intensifying security 
dilemmas and strategic rivalries. [H]ow adversaries are described reverberates in the domestic 
politics of both sides. The effect is often the narrowing of public discourse.42  
 
The connection between discursive ‘narrowing’ and policy hardening is a well-studied field.43 
Discursive co-constitution is helpful to explicate the consequentiality of even 
unsuccessful securitising moves in inter-unit interactions. Inter-discursivity entails that 
representational practices, regardless of success or failure in securitization terms, are not self-
contained. This is even more problematic if the adversarial camps are sub-units within a larger 
entity (hostile ethnic groups within one state) or vertically competitive units (states and 
separatist groups). The discursive overflows are not even inadvertent here. The threatening 
‘Other’ is an unavoidable audience, sometimes by design (e.g. Chinese propaganda and 
Patriotic Education Campaigns in Tibet). Yet, the ‘other’ is rarely treated as an audience.  
The notion of overlapping audience gains salience as this structural condition enables 
discursive co-constitution. Since the securitised other is privy to the construction of itself as a 
threat to be dealt with, often accompanied by derogatory and offensive words and images, this 
sets off counter-securitizing moves. Discourse in Unit A about Unit B gets picked up by 
members of Unit B and shapes its discourse about the former and vice versa, entailing practical 
ramifications for identity and difference. The degree of inter-discursivity (access to rival 
discourses and audience overlap) and the resultant degree of co-constitution of identity 
determine whether or not a given securitization will set off counter-securitization.  
 
Emergency measures and ‘inter-unit chain reactions’ 
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Once a securitising move gains the acceptance of the audience, the securitizing agent activates 
emergency measures against the invoked threat. By definition, these measures have far-
reaching consequences on ‘inter-unit’ relations. If the speech act inherent in the securitizing 
move did not set off a counter-securitization, the implementation of the emergency measures 
will. CS recognized the latter point when they wrote about ‘effects on inter-unit relations’ and 
‘chain reactions' arising from the activation of extra-ordinary measures.44 The scale of the inter-
unit effect is a function of the intensity of the emergency actions. Actions short of war could 
also have far-reaching consequences, including war. Stritzel and Chang provide compelling 
evidence of this from securitization. In any case, this phase is the core concern of much of the 
international security literature. Ultimately, securitization is a ‘type of political game 
constituted by moves and countermoves.’45 
To sum up, this research proposed two stages along the process of securitization with 
the biggest ramification for inter-unit security: the initial securitizing move and the actual 
security measures. It showed in contradistinction to the existing theories that failed securitizing 
moves can have inter-unit security implications. Vitriolic rhetoric and discursive 
(mis)representations, even if unsuccessful in unleashing security measures, provoke counter-
securitizations. This theoretical reconstruction connects the actor-audience interaction at the 
unit-level to the inter-unit dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
                                
                                   
  
  
                      
 
  Unit/Sub-Unit A           Unit/Sub-Unit B 
             Inter-unit theory of securitization theory 
SA Securitizing Actor 
SM Securitising Move 
SS Successful Securitization 
ESMs Emergency Security Measures 
Inter-discursivity, 
Identity and ESMs 
 SA 
ESMs 
 SA 
ESMs 
 
 
Audience  Audience 
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In addition to the degree of interdiscursivity and intensity of the emergency threat, contextual 
resonance is just as important for counter-securitization to stick as it is for securitization. As 
Balzacq  contends, ‘…to move an audience’s attention toward an event or a development 
construed as dangerous, the words of the securitizing actor need to resonate with the context 
within which his/her actions are collocated’.46 Contextual factors include sectoral (e.g. state or 
societal security?), social (authority or social capital, and emotional and psychological 
condition of the audience), political (democratic or authoritarian?), historical (‘conditions 
historically associated with that threat’).47 The socio-political and historical contexts will be 
given special attention in this article. 
 
Tibetan Self-Immolations, Inter-Discursivity and Emergency Acts 
Since 27 February 2009, 14348 Tibetans inside Tibet have self-immolated, representing a cross-
section of the Tibetan population, including three reincarnate Lamas,  six students (two female 
and three male middle school), nomads, farmers, laborers, a carpenter, a blogger, a Thanka 
(traditional Tibetan painting) artist, a taxi driver, a forestry worker and a former Communist 
party official.49 Only eight cases have been reported from Tibet Autonomous Region.50 Forty 
nine self-immolators have left behind final testimonies, which are crucial for any effort to 
understand why they have chosen this form of protest.51  
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Tibetan areas and sites of the self-immolations.
52
 (Map by International Campaign for Tibet) 
 
Why did so many Tibetans turn to self-immolation in such a short period of time? The 
Chinese government has repeatedly and consistently attributed the self-immolations to ‘behind-
the-scenes orchestration [by the ‘Dalai clique’] with a transparent political motive 
[separatism]’.53 Wu Zegang, Party Secretary of Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture said 
that the ‘victims [self-immolators] were used by separatists [‘The Dalai Lama clique and 
overseas separatist forces’] to create chaos’.54 The self-immolations are ‘overseas plots’.55 
Tibetan leaders, including the Dalai Lama, portray the self-immolations as a symptom of ‘deep 
desperation’ among the Tibetans as a result of ‘repressive’ Chinese policies.56 Without 
condoning or condemning the self-immolators, the Dalai Lama frequently calls upon the 
Chinese authorities to conduct a ‘thorough investigation’ of the causes of the self-immolations 
and learn about their grievances. There is unmistakably clear day light between the official 
Chinese and Tibetan views on the self-immolations.  
The self-immolations have also received much scholarly attention already. As noted 
above, two academic journals—Cultural Anthropology and Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 
[Tibetan Studies Journal]—have dedicated special issues to make sense of these tragic events 
in Tibet. In these scholarly considerations, the self-immolations have been read as protest 
against localised repression (nomad resettlement and Patriotic Education Campaigns) and/or 
resistance against threats to broader ‘civilizational preservation’ interests (Shakya; Sperling; 
Berounský; Fischer); mass mediated communication (Makley); demonstration of ‘virtuoso’ 
(spiritual) power of Tibetan monks against the military and legal power of the Chinese state 
(Gyatso); an ‘embodied expression of humanity’ through ‘an unparalleled example of 
Bodhisattva mind’ [self-less offering of one’s own body], demonstration of ‘ultimate self-
discipline’ against the ‘disciplining biopolitics’ of life under Chinese rule (Craig); ‘reclamation 
of sovereignty’ over one’s body and individual life (Yeh and Litzinger); taking on ‘virtuous 
pain’ (Mingyur); a ‘social fact in the Durkheimian sense’ (Tan); and manifest influence of 
Chinese popular culture (Barnett). These perspectives treat the self-immolations either as 
nationalistic acts of protest and resistance and asymmetric contests over power and sovereignty 
or forms of communication and ritual offerings. Each of these perspectives captures and 
emphasises a different slice of the complex and extended reality behind the self-immolations 
includes an intolerable trigger (generally state policies and practices), a prior phase of 
preparation (sometimes writing or recording final statements), the momentary act of setting 
oneself aflame, an agenda for communication, and intended or unintended effects (the issue of 
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perlocution). There are two types of communication here: (1) speech act in the form of final 
statements left behind by the immolators; and (2) Karin Fierke’s “‘act of speech’ in which the 
suffering body communicates the injustice experienced by a community to a larger audience”.57 
The self-immolations should therefore be understood as extended and composite events rather 
than just discrete instances. Since theory should be as complex as the empirical reality, any 
study of the self-immolations should be attentive to all these elements. Counter-securitization 
recognises this complexity. 
First, counter-securitization, with its attention to both the performative language and 
the communicative act, and equally attentive to the prior trigger (securitization) and the 
consequences (reverse-securitization), provides the framework for synthesising these various 
elements into one coherent analysis. Second, it brings out the interactive dynamics between 
Chinese and Tibetan security imperatives much more clearly than the existing understandings 
of the self-immolations. Third, counter-securitization helps us to understand the self-
immolations in terms of a security competition between two insecure communities rather than 
just through the general prism of repression versus resistance. Fourth, it does so in a way that 
securityness is not taken for granted and seen as objectively existing prior to interaction, but as 
a social product of the dynamic and tormented intercourse between the Chinese state and the 
Tibetans. Finally, counter-securitization imputes a security rationale to the Tibetan actions and 
articulations vis-à-vis China, which challenges the dominant view of the Tibetan actions as 
irrational and ethno-nationalistic. The following analysis of the self-immolations reflects these 
value-additions. It is important to note in agreement with Stritzel and Chang, however, that 
counter-securitization is just a ‘particular expression’ and not the entirety of resistance. As 
such, the Tibetan resistance is more than counter-securitization, but the latter captures the most 
salient elements of the former. 
  
I. China Securitizes the Tibetans 
In March 2008, Tibetans on the Tibetan plateau58 rose up in the biggest challenge to Chinese 
rule since the 1950s.59 Beginning with peaceful protests on the 10th March Anniversary of the 
Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the next three days, which were put down brutally by the security 
forces, Tibetans rioted on 14 March in Lhasa and in other towns in the East in the following 
days. The Chinese government claimed that 18 civilians and one policeman died and 382 
civilians were injured on 14 March, 2008.60 The Tibetan Government-in-exile (TGIE) and 
rights groups claim that 220 Tibetans were killed, 5600 arrested or detained, 1,294 injured and 
290 sentenced and over 1,000 disappeared in the ensuing crackdown.61  
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The consequences were far reaching. Not only did the uprising widen the chasm 
between Dharamsala, the seat of the Dalai Lama and TGIE, and Beijing, it also disrupted some 
of China’s key foreign relations. The Tibetans attributed the protests to ‘deep-rooted 
resentment of the Tibetan people’ under China’s ‘flawed and repressive policies’.62 Beijing 
claimed that it had ‘plenty of evidence’ proving that the uprising was ‘organized, premeditated, 
masterminded and incited by the Dalai Lama clique’.63 The securitization of the Tibetan 
protests by the Chinese is obvious from the speech act contained in the statements of Chinese 
leaders, their domestic and international propaganda, Patriotic Education Campaigns (PEC), 
bureaucratic practices such as ethnic profiling and surveillance, Tibet’s near-total lock-down 
and information black-out, and the military and paramilitary crackdown. 
 President Hu Jintao described the Chinese-Tibetan conflict as ‘a problem either to 
safeguard national unification or to split the motherland’.64 Wen Jiabao told Fareed Zakaria the 
same thing on CNN.65 Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told a European journalist that the Tibet 
issue concerns ‘China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is not a religious or ethnic 
issue’.66 When the Chinese media started to cover the riots in Lhasa, in a decidedly one-sided 
propaganda, Chinese netizens commented on Strong Nation Forum, a discussion-forum hosted 
by People's Daily, from which the BBC Worldwide Monitoring carried ‘a sample of the 
postings’.67 It clearly revealed that many ordinary Chinese also interpreted the Tibetan uprising 
as a threat to ‘national security’. The Chinese representations of the Tibetan protests went 
beyond blaming the ‘Dalai Lama clique’.  
As soon as the Tibetan uprising began in March 2008, the Chinese officials and media 
sprang into action to securitize the Tibetan uprising. In official statements and all over the 
Chinese media, including overseas outlets, the Tibetan protests were characterized as ‘beating, 
looting, smashing and burning’, and the Dalai Lama, ‘Dalai clique’ and hostile ‘western forces’ 
were blamed of orchestrating the protests.68 The Dalai Lama was called a ‘terrorist’ colluding 
with Muslim ‘terrorists’ and the Tibetan Youth Congress ‘a terrorist organization much [more] 
catastrophic than bin Laden’s’.69 Zhang Qingli, then-Party Secretary of Tibet Autonomous 
Region, said, ‘We are now engaged in a ﬁerce blood-and-ﬁre battle with the Dalai clique, a 
life-and-death battle between us and the enemy’. Any form of Tibetan  opposition was 
invariably labelled ‘separatism’ or ‘splittism’ in collusion with ‘hostile’ foreign forces, most 
commonly America.70 As Woeser put it, ‘In their eyes, all Tibetans are a threat….Tibetans are 
the enemies against whom ever stronger defenses must be build’.71 
However, official utterances and writings (speech acts) are not the only means of 
securitizing the Tibetans as a group. Reflecting the wider modes of securitization unearthed by 
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the post-CS theorization, the Chinese authorities also extensively deployed existing and new 
policy instruments, bureaucratic practices and routines, and images and televisual images in 
their securitization of the Tibetans.  
After the main protests, The government went on the offensive against ‘the Dalai 
clique’ by controlling the domestic media coverage of the protests and riots and keeping out 
foreign journalists,72 shutting down the communication infrastructure in the Tibetan regions 
and playing on national TV round-the-clock clips of the Tibetan rioters, especially Tibetan 
monks, burning and destroying Chinese and state properties and attacking Chinese civilians 
and filling up the pages of print media with the same stories and screen-grabs. These images 
were relayed on overseas Chinese media outlets. As Barnett wrote, ‘For most people in China, 
the story of the Tibet uprising starts and ends with what is now called “the 3/14 incident”—
what has been portrayed there as the brutal beating and killing of Chinese civilians by rabid 
Tibetan nationalists’.73 CCTV, the official Chinese TV network quickly made a documentary 
titled ‘Records of the Lhasa Riots’ which was ‘ceremoniously released and broadcast on prime 
time over and over again; it even became available on DVD’.74  Carrico captures it eloquently:  
 
This onslaught of images constituted an arguably unprecedented media campaign to consolidate the 
official line on Tibet. It provided seemingly irrefutable visual proof of a simple narrative imposed 
upon complex events: irrational, violent, and threatening “Tibetan separatists” suddenly and 
seemingly out of nowhere unleashed senseless violence against Han residents interested only in 
“helping Tibet develop.” Within this presentation, the source of protests had to be found either 
outside of Tibet proper (i.e., “the Dalai clique”) or solely inside the purportedly troubled minds of 
protestors (i.e., “hooligans”), so as to ensure that they not be found in historical grievances or the 
current sociopolitical context of occupation.75 (Emphasis added) 
 
 
Influenced by such portrayal of Tibetans and their protests in the official media and private 
channels, Tibetans and Uyghurs became targets of official surveillance and public 
discrimination in Tibet and the Chinese areas.76 It was not difficult to convince the Han Chinese 
audience, which had been primed for securitization through Patriotic Education Campaigns, 
propaganda, censorship and manipulation of the media, and public education. 
Tibetans complained frequently of racial profiling in their own homeland: the security 
forces stop Tibetans for identity check, letting the Chinese go un-accosted in Lhasa. The 
Tibetans were also subjected to relentless propaganda through the locale media to ‘thoroughly 
expose and criticize the evil deeds of the Dalai separatist clique in instigating and 
masterminding the “3.14” incident of serious crimes of beating, smashing, looting’ and to 
besmirch the Dalai Lama’s status as a Tibetan Buddhist Lama, champion of Tibetan rights and 
icon of peace and to reveal his ‘reactionary’ ‘two-faced tactics’ of instigating violence to seek 
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independence while speaking of peace and dialogue.77 This propaganda directed towards the 
Tibetans and PEC discussed below show that the Chinese authorities viewed the Tibetans as 
an audience to be persuaded or coerced into accepting their securitization. 
 
PEC: Tibetans as China’s intended audience 
In the theory section, I posited that the securitized subject could be an audience for the 
securitizing actor, intentionally or unintentionally. PEC positions the Tibetans into the role of 
China’s strategic audience. One of the immediate Chinese responses was to blockade the 
monasteries and step up PEC in all Tibetan regions.78 Leading an official delegation to Lhasa 
in 23-24 March, the Chinese Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, told members of the 
management committees of the Lhasa monasteries that the Dalai Lama is ‘unfit to be a true 
follower of Buddhism, and called for broader “patriotic education” in TAR’.79 In a Regulation 
publicized on 18 July, 2008 by the local government of Kartze TAP, Sichuan, ‘Order No. 2 of 
the People’s Government of Kartze TAP’ threatened the entire monastic hierarchy with 
reprisals for anti-Chinese disturbances: monks and nuns who protest and refuse to ‘conform’ 
and submit to PEC will be expelled and their residence demolished; reincarnates and senior 
monks could be ‘stripped of the right to hold the reincarnation lineage’ for communicating with 
foreigners or engaging in anti-China protests; monasteries/nunneries where a specific 
percentage of monks/nuns have engaged in dissident activities will banned from performing 
Buddhist rituals; and senior Buddhist teachers could face public ‘rectification’ or imprisonment 
if they ‘tolerated’ any protest activity, peaceful or otherwise.80 Kartze Daily reported that PEC 
was also being conducted in Tibetan villages and schools.81 PEC was vigorously conducted in 
the eastern Tibetan regions of Gansu and Qinghai too.82 Ordinary Tibetans were forced under 
threats of imprisonment to denounce the Dalai Lama and declare loyalty and gratitude to the 
Party.83 Woeser’s update shows that in many cases Tibetan protests were provoked by PEC 
sessions, which required denouncing the Dalai Lama, a most heart-breaking think for most 
Tibetans to do.84 
 On 1 April, the authorities conducted PEC inside Dza Wonpo Monastery, Dzachukha  
County, Kartze, ordering the monks to criticize and denounce the Dalai Lama, provoking a 
monk-led protest (Woeser, ‘Tibet Update 2’).85 On 2 April, PEC was initiated in Ba Chode 
Monastery, Batang County, Kartze, resulting in clashes and arrests of monks, including the 
abbot and disciplinarian. On 3 April, PAP and a PEC work unit ransacked Tongkor monastery, 
Kartze, confiscating mobile phones and throwing the photographs of the Dalai Lama and the 
monastery’s abbot to the ground, and ordered the monks to ‘curse’ the Dalai Lama. The monks 
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started a protest joined by lay Tibetans from that area, reportedly resulting in many fatalities.86 
Monks of Pada Sangdruling Monastery in Dzachukha, Kartze, refused to cooperate in a PEC 
session on 26 April, creating a tense situation.87 The intensification of PEC in all Tibetan 
regions fomented great resentment towards the Chinese authorities, creating the conditions for 
the Tibetan counter-securitization.88  
 
Inter-discursivity: Tibetans as China’s unintended audience 
It was argued above that the securitized subject could discursively infiltrate the securitizer, 
becoming an unintended audience. This is discursive inter-penetration and audience-overlap. 
While PEC is an element in the Chinese state’s direct and intended communication with the 
Tibetans, especially those who have been branded as troublesome, there is a discourse among 
the Chinese about Tibetans which is accessible to the latter. Contrary to the dominant notion 
of the single self-contained audience in the securitization literature, the Tibetans are privy to 
the ‘private’ Chinese discourse about them. This is partly because some elements of the intra-
Chinese discourse seep through in their direct communication with the Tibetans through PEC, 
official statements, education and media. Equally significantly, thanks to education in 
Mandarin Chinese, more and more Tibetans are fluent in spoken and written Chinese. They are 
not just privy to, but also capable of interjecting themselves into the discourse. Beijing-based 
Tsering Woeser, who blogs in Chinese, is exemplary in this respect.89 
A helpful illustration of the Tibetan penetration of the Chinese Tibet discourse is the 
case of the CCTV serial ‘Secret Tibet’, a 46-episode, Chinese language drama about 1930-
1940’s Tibet, directed by Liu Depin and broadcast on primetime TV beginning in January 
2013.90 This ‘historical’ drama was marketed as an ‘accurate representation’ and an ‘important 
source for Han Chinese to understand Tibetan history, culture and religion’.91 Immediately, it 
provoked a fire-storm of online Tibetan criticism for distorting Tibetan history and 
misrepresenting and ‘demonizing’ Tibetan people and their culture. The film portrayed Tibet 
and Tibetan society as thoroughly barbaric, cruel and violent, which somehow was also under 
the rule of Nationalist China. Lhasa-controlled Tibet (the setting of the drama) was de facto 
independent until 1950. Tsewang Thar wrote in his Chinese language blog: ‘This TV drama is 
to ridicule Tibet, insult Tibetans and debase Tibetan culture. You are responsible for the 
destruction of the relation between Han [Chinese] and Tibetan and the stability of the society’.92 
A group of young Tibetans formed a rap group, satirically named ‘Sheep Droppings’, and 
attacked Liu Deping and his team with a rap-song titled ‘Respect’. Singing in Chinese, they 
accused ‘fucking Liu Debin’  and his ‘[u]neducated and ignorant, mendacious and deceptive’ 
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cast and crew of ‘distorting history…with filthy thoughts and ugly ideas’, ‘slander[ing] Tibet’s 
thousands of years of history’ and ‘defaming our people’.93 Woeser also blogged that ‘Secret 
Tibet’ was full of ‘distortions and deformities…and very arrogant’. 94 Characteristically, Liu 
Deping responded by labelling his critics ‘contemptible scoundrels’ and ‘separatists’. Many 
similar episodes have preceded ‘Secret Tibet’ and hindered Chinese-Tibetan relations at the 
popular level. This Tibetan infiltration into the Chinese discourse reinforces the strength of 
Tibetan identity, consistent with Butler’s point about the production of identity and difference 
through discursive representation. Thar’s charge that ‘Secret Tibet’ destroyed Chinese-Tibetan 
relations and social stability is illustrative of the security consequentiality of (mis)representing 
others as violent and threatening long before emergency actions are executed. Existing theories 
of securitization treat these as inconsequential until and unless they graduate to actual 
emergency measures.  
 Of course, in the Chinese response to the 2008 uprising, the representational practices 
activated a militarized crackdown accompanied by various other security measures. 
 
The Military Crackdown   
To the puzzlement of many observers, when the Tibetan protests descended into a riot on 14 
March, 2008, the security forces had vacated the entire area. When they did come back, it was 
a full-scale military operation conducted by the Peoples Armed Police (PAP) and Peoples 
Liberation Army (PLA). Chinese officials resisted formally declaring martial law, denied the 
deployment of regular soldiers and rejected the death of any Tibetans. James Miles of the 
Economist reported that Lhasa was effectively under martial law and reported seeing 
‘numerous…military vehicles, military looking vehicles with tell-tale license plates covered 
up or removed. And also many troops there whose uniforms were distinctly lacking in the usual 
insignia of either the police or the riot police. So my very, very strong suspicion is that the 
army is out there and is in control in Lhasa’.95 Andrei Chang, a defense analyst confirmed: ‘T-
90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the 
streets as the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Region 
was dispatched to Lhasa’.96 He also observed that the soldiers were ‘all wearing the “leopard” 
camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operations’ of the 149th 
Division.  
In Lhasa, a number of Tibetans were killed by the security forces.97 But large scale 
protests also took place in other parts of Tibet on 14 March: Toelung Dechen and Chushul, 
Samye and Shigatse in Utsang (TAR), Sangchu (Gansu) and Dzoge, Lithang and Sershul 
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(Sichuan).98 On 16 March, prisoners were paraded through the streets of Lhasa in military 
vehicles. Despite the heavy military presence, protesters lingered on in and around Lhasa and 
the death toll mounted on the Tibetan side. TGIE claims that over 80 Tibetans died on 14 March 
and 160 by the end of March in Lhasa.99 Using police photos and the ubiquitous surveillance 
cameras, the authorities began to issue daily ‘Most Wanted Lists’ and text messages were sent 
to all mobile users in Tibet directing them to inform on protestors. The security crackdown in 
Lhasa and Eastern Tibet included brutal raids into homes and monasteries during which 
photographs of the Dalai Lama and other revered Lamas were trashed and trampled upon, 
arbitrary detentions, stepped-up surveillance in monasteries, and permanent police stations 
inside  monasteries, intensified PECs during which monks and nuns were forced to renounce 
the Dalai Lama, building walls around monasteries to keep monks in and pilgrims out and 
banning of religious activities.100 These measures were buttressed by an escalating security 
budget in the Tibetan regions. Between 2002 and 2009, per capita annual spending on internal 
security in Ngawa County in Sichuan province, the epicenter of the self-immolations, had 
increased from three times to five times the average security budgets of the non-Tibetan 
counties in that province. Within the same period, Ngawa experienced a 619 percent increase 
in public security spending. 
In essence, China securitized and waged war on the Tibetans, laying the ground for a 
multifaceted Tibetan counter-securitization.  
 
II. The Tibetans counter-securitize  
The brutal crackdown in 2008 has failed to stabilise Tibet. The Tibetans have responded to 
China’s repression through ‘non-cooperation movements; boycotts; White Wednesdays 
(lhakar) during which people eat Tibetan food but no meat, speak Tibetan and wear Tibetan 
clothes; vegetarianism; abandonment of monasteries by nuns and monks to escape from the 
new rules; demonstrations in support of the Tibetan language; coded radical poetry; and self-
immolations’.101  
That the self-immolators were reacting to the Chinese crackdown in 2008 is clear from 
the time-line. The first ever self-immolation as a political protest inside Tibet happened on 27 
February, 2009, almost a year after the 2008 uprising.102 Monks from Ngawa prefecture, where 
it happened, said, ‘In 2008, they beat, arrested, crippled, and killed us Tibetans without a 
second thought. Many of us came to realize through this experience the need to resist the 
Chinese government for what it was doing to our people…. 2008 was a wake-up call for us. It 
changed us’.103 Tibetans first resorted to self-immolations because China’s hyper-securitized 
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practices in Tibet after 2008 had left no other option for the Tibetans. 104 As Woeser wrote, ‘In 
such a stifling environment, there is no longer any space for popular protests to develop.’105  
The self-immolators are reacting not just to the brutal security and surveillance 
operations and bureaucratic practices, but also to the discursive content of PEC, state 
propaganda and locale media coverage.  Some of the later self-immolations were partly 
provoked by the Chinese state’s relentless securitization and wilful misrepresentation of the 
earlier self-immolators and their acts of resistance. Chinese officials and state-media framed 
the self-immolators as ‘terrorists’, ‘separatists’, ‘splittists’, ‘criminals’, psychological and 
sexual deviants, sociopaths, cult members, or failures in academic and marital lives.106 For 
Yeh, the Chinese government labels the self-immolations as terrorism because of the need for 
‘constant mobilization of threat’ to maintain control over Tibet.107 To accentuate the threat-
level, they portray the self-immolations as organised by hostile overseas forces. To ensure that 
these representations stick with their audience, CCTV broadcast five special programmes on 
the self-immolations amounting to two hours of airtime, which were then replayed several 
times. In another instance of Tibetan penetration of a Chinese discourse, Tibetan intellectuals, 
writing in both Tibetan and Chinese, countered these representations by glorifying the self-
immolators as ‘national heroes’ (mi-rigs gi dpa-wo).108 The Chinese representation of the self-
immolators were accompanied by further escalation of the security measures in place since 
Spring 2008, wherever self-immolations happened, aggravating local conditions and provoking 
more self-immolations. Analysis of the testimonies left behind by a number of the self-
immolators bears these out. 
 This article builds upon Woeser’s careful content/thematic analysis of forty nine final 
statements left behind by self-immolators. Her findings are summarised in the table reproduced 
below.  
 
 
Themes articulated by self-immolators 
No. of final 
statements 
addressing this 
theme 
No. of 
individuals 
involved 
% of 
sample  
1 Taking action 15 17 37.0% 
2 Praying for the Dalai Lama 13 14 30.4% 
3 Showing courage and responsibility 12 13 28.3% 
4 National identity and solidarity 11 11 23.9% 
5 Promoting Tibetan independence 10 10 21.7% 
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6 
Protests against the government and 
demands for change 
9 9 19.6% 
7 Unable to bear life 8 8 17.4% 
8 Protecting the national language 6 6 13.0% 
9 
Drawing international attention to 
Tibet 
3 3 6.5% 
        
       Woeser, Self-Immolations in Tibet, pp. 25. 
 
Woeser captures the relative frequency of the key themes contained in the statements, but some 
of the themes can be collapsed into others so as to enhance their relative significance. First, 
‘Protecting the national language’ can be incorporated into ‘National identity and solidarity’. 
For the Tibetans including the self-immolators, contrary to the deconstructionist analysts, what 
constitutes Tibetan identity and makes them distinctive from the Chinese are cultural markers 
like Tibetan language, Buddhism, dress, food and so on. If references to Buddhism are 
included, ‘National Identity’ will be even more prominent. Second, ‘Protests against the 
government and demands for change’ can be collapsed into ‘Taking action’ or vice-versa. The 
category for ‘Showing courage and responsibility’ could also be incorporated into ‘Taking 
Action.’ In fact, all the self-immolations are acts of securitization and/or resistance against the 
Chinese state. These methodological tweaks are reflected in the analysis that follows. 
That the self-immolations have been a reaction to the climate of fear created by the 
securitization of Tibetan life, especially after 2008, which are seen as existential threats to the 
survival of the Tibetan nation, and that self-immolation is an extra-ordinary act after exhausting 
all other means is clear from the words of Tashi Wangchuk, a young Tibetan shop-keeper from 
Qinghai province, as told to the New York Times.   
 
So many people have self-immolated. I can understand them now because we have very few ways 
to solve problems. No one wants to live in an environment that’s full of pressure and fear. In effect, 
there is systematic slaughter of our culture. In politics, it’s said that if one nation wishes to eliminate 
another nation, first they need to eliminate their spoken and written language. Normally we dare 
not discuss it because many phones are tapped and we don’t know where the surveillance devices 
are. They can arrest you under any name and there is no way to appeal since the legal system is 
imperfect.  Since 2009, more than 140 people have self-immolated…. I believe they also saw culture 
disappearing and other cultural problems…. Have I ever thought about self-immolation as an 
option? If this [efforts to take legal action in Beijing against provincial governments who enforce 
education policies which privilege Chinese and undermine Tibetan language education] comes to 
an end and I’m locked up and cannot proceed with what I’m doing and they force me to say or do 
things I don’t want to say, I will choose suicide [self-immolation?].109 
 
Tashi travelled all the way to Beijing to take legal action against local authorities and to attract 
the attention of the Chinese media. These are upheld by the words of many Tibetans who 
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actually committed self-immolations. It is clear from below that the Tibetans are responding to 
both the Chinese representational and security practices and the physical acts of state 
repression.  
 
 
Designation of Threat 
Counter-securitization begins by identifying threats to important values in the 
securitizing language and actions of an adversary. The securitized strikes back at the 
securitizer in kind.  The Tibetan self-immolators leave no doubts as to who/what poses 
the main threat to their identity: China’s discursive and (mis)representational practices 
and repressive policies. Tamdin Tso’s case is illustrative of the former. After her self-
immolation, Tamdin’s father recollected: 
What triggered her self-immolation seems to be what happened about one month ago, when she 
went to Rebkong town with me and saw the posters which were distributed by the new local leader, 
Jiangshu Cheng, banning His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s picture and telling people to publicly 
protest separatists and their activities. She was visibly angry and felt very sad to see those posters.  
 
Regarding the latter, Gudup, a 43-year-old writer who self-immolated on October 4, 2012, 
wrote, ‘[Tibet] is now tainted with red blood, where military crack downs are unceasing. We, 
sons and daughters of [Tibet], will win the battle through truth, by shooting the arrows of our 
lives, by using the bows of our minds.’ 
Nine statements explicitly point out China as the source of threats and the target of their 
protest. Nyangkar Tashi puts it bluntly, ‘I self-immolate to protest against the Chinese 
government!’ Lhamo Kyap, a herdsman in his 20s who self-immolated on 20 October, 2012, 
told a friend over the phone in the morning, ‘China does not let us leave in peace’. Gudup, 
wrote: 
 
His Holiness Dalai Lama advocates for a non-violent middle-way policy for the right to Tibetan 
autonomy. Six million Tibetans have been following His Holiness’ teaching. But the CCP shows 
no support. Instead, they arrested and tortured those who demand Tibetan's rights. They defame 
Dalai Lama and when anyone does not recognize Tibet as part of China, they will disappear or be 
assassinated. 
 
 
Even when they do not mention China or the Chinese explicitly, it is clear from implication 
that they hold the Chinese state and its agents responsible for creating the conditions that drove 
them to commit self-immolations. As Woeser wrote, each self-immolation is ‘a deeply 
symbolic act of protest and demand for change.’110  
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The Value of Tibetan Identity  
My people have no freedom of language. Everybody is mixing Tibetan and Chinese [language]…. 
Where is my Land of Snow [Tibet] going, friend? Where is my Land of Snow going?.... [This is] for 
the sake of Tibet. We are in the Land of Snow. If we don't have our freedom, cultural traditions and 
language, it would be extremely embarrassing for us. We must therefore learn them. Every 
nationality needs freedom, language and tradition. Without language, what would be our 
nationality? [Should we then] call ourselves Chinese or Tibetan? 
 
These are the haunting words of Ngawang Norphel as he lay dying under the care of the monks 
of Zhilkar monastery (Yulshul TAP, Qinghai), after his self-immolation with Tenzin Khedup 
on 20 June, 2012. A seven minute cell-phone video of Ngawang’s conversation with the monks 
of Zhilkar monastery has been uploaded onto Youtube.111 Despite being severely disfigured 
and visibly struggling with his words, Ngawang’s fear for Tibetan national identity could not 
be expressed more strongly.   
As I have demonstrated elsewhere,112 the Tibetan resistance is fundamentally driven by 
identity insecurity (i.e. fear for the survival and reproduction of their identity). If the capacity 
to excite the emotion of fear is crucial for the practices of securitization, as Rythoven posits,113 
Tibet could not be a more fertile territory for securitization, given the memories of six decades 
of Chinese assault on Tibetan culture and identity.114 Tibetans also have political, ecological 
and economic insecurities, but identity security appears to be the predominant concern.115 The 
self-immolators also directly or indirectly portray the Chinese policies and practices as posing 
existential threats to Tibetan identity. As we can observe in Woeser’s thematic analysis above, 
just ‘national identity’, even if we exclude associated values such as language, Buddhism and 
traditions, received more frequent mention than the political value of ‘independence’ in the 
final statements. If the final statements expressing concern for national language are 
incorporated into the ‘National Identity’ category, we get an aggregate of seventeen statements 
out of forty nine (35 percent), making it the most common theme across the statements. If we 
count references to the repression of Tibetan Buddhism and other traditions, this category will 
be even more pronounced. 
 Nyankar Tashi, a nomad who self-immolated on 24 November, 2012 in Tongren 
County, Qinghai Province, left behind a letter, which stated in part that ‘My wish is that six 
million Tibetans will learn their mother tongue, wear Tibetan clothes and be united’.  Tenzin 
Kedhup and Ngawang Norphel self-immolated together in Chindu County, Qinghai Province 
on June 20, 2012 after recording their final message. They said, ‘[We] do not have the ability 
to help Tibetan’s religion and culture…. [W]e have to be united and protect our nation’. Sonam, 
a 24-year-old student and Choephak Kyab, a 25-year-old student burned themselves near the 
monastery of Dzamthang, Sichuan Province, on April 19, 2012. In their joint statement, Sonam 
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and Kyab asserted, ‘The Tibetan nation is distinct from the others as it has its own religion and 
culture…. If you [Tibetans] feel sad for us,... learn and keep alive our culture and traditions’. 
Nangdrol, an eighteen year old student who carried out his self-immolation on 19 February, 
2012, advised the ‘Men and women of Tibet’ to ‘wear Tibetan clothes if you are Tibetan. 
Moreover, you must speak Tibetan. Never forget that you are Tibetan’.116 Tulku Sobha, a 
reincarnate Lama who self-immolated on 8 January, 2012, also left behind an audio message, 
urging fellow Tibetans: 
You must unite and work together to build a strong and prosperous Tibetan nation in the future. 
This is the sole wish of all the Tibetan heroes [who self-immolated]…. You must maintain unity 
and strength. Give love and education to the children, who should study hard to master all the 
traditional fields of [Tibetan] studies. The elders should carry out spiritual practice as well as 
maintain and protect Tibetan language and culture by using all your resources and by involving 
your body, speech and mind.117 (Emphasis mine) 
 
Clearly, the protection of Tibetan identity or what they believe to be the markers of Tibetan 
identity is one of the key objectives. The Tibetans feel that they lack the freedom to practise 
and reproduce these elements of their identity. As Tenzin, a 23-year-old herdswoman who self-
immolated on 7 November, 2012, wrote in a note to her father, ‘Father, being Tibetan is so 
difficult….’  
 
The self-immolators’ multiple audiences 
The communicative aspect of self-immolations has been captured well in the existing 
literature.118 As noted above, self-immolations contain two forms of communication, speech 
acts and acts-of speech, each with separate, overlapping audiences. These two forms of 
communication have different intended audiences. The speech act, with its grammar of security 
contained in the final statements or post-immolation words of survivors—designation of threat 
to important values and exhortation toward action such as strengthening unity and reinforcing 
cultural practices (e.g. learning and speaking Tibetan, wearing Tibetan clothes, eating Tibetan 
food etc.)—is clearly intended for the Tibetans audience. The quotes above from the final 
statements reveal this relationship between the self-immolators and the Tibetan community. 
These parting words of the reincarnate Lama Sobha are illustrative:  
 
United, young [Tibetans] should treasure and acquire the ten traditional sciences [of Tibetan 
learning]. The old should prevent the decline of their long accustomed [Tibetan] language.119 
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Thanks to the intrusive network of surveillance and Tibetan collaborators, the Chinese 
authorities are quick to penetrate the Tibetan discourses, which explains the incarceration of 
many Tibetan writers and singers. 
On the other hand, the ‘act of speech’ is directed more towards the Chinese, 
communicating ‘a message of resistance to foreign interference or occupation’ towards a 
perpetrating ‘other’.120 It is an intense expression of protest, denouncement, defiance and at 
once reclamation of sovereignty over individual body and life from the oppressor: an 
unequivocal act of resistance.121 The graphic images and videos rhetorically ‘suspends’ and 
‘postpones’ death as well as ‘implicate several distinct audiences with a shared sense of 
responsibility’.122  
Shakya characterises the Tibetan turn to self-immolations as a ‘change in the language 
of protest’.123 Drawing upon Verdery’s ‘political lives of dead bodies’, Makley suggests that 
the Tibetan self-immolations are ‘situated forms of communication (where the burning body 
becomes a primary medium versus, as in suicide bombers, a crucial weapon)’ in retaliation to 
the ‘extreme states of siege, where state narratives dominate all public speech’ and Tibetans 
lack ‘access to words’.124 Tang Danhong called the Tibetan self-immolations ‘a language of 
intense pain, an intensely painful denouncement–a way to communicate the extent of the 
atrocity they endure’.125 Here, the Chinese are the target audience of ‘protest’, for expressing 
‘grievances’ or for ‘denouncement’. Indeed, there was a sharp spike in self-immolations around 
the 18th Party Congress of the CCP on 8 November, 2012. On the day of his self-immolation, 
Lhamo Kyab reportedly asked his friend over the phone when the Party Congress was going to 
be held.  
It is also possible that the international community is an audience for a few of the self-
immolators to highlight perceived Chinese violations and to seek some kind of international 
intervention. The point here is that the self-immolators have different audiences for different 
purposes.  
 
Facilitating contexts 
As McDonald argues, studying the historical and socio-political contexts is crucial for 
understanding why ‘particular discourses of security…become possible’ and why certain 
societies are more receptive to particular representations of threat.126 In the Sino-Tibetan 
encounter, the contextual factors are nothing but propitious for the counter-securitization to 
stick. This author has charted elsewhere over six-decades of security competition between the 
Chinese state and the Tibetans in the form of the insecurity dilemma.127 It was also shown that 
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throughout these historical periods, the all-consuming driver of Tibetan resistance was their 
identity insecurity.128 During his fieldtrips, Tibetologist Germano observed in Tibet a ‘deep, 
abiding cultural depression among … the educated youth and religious elite to nomads and 
villagers’.129 A siege mentality has been a constant feature of Tibetan life whereby their identity 
is ravaged by wave after wave of Chinese cultural and political onslaughts. The first self-
immolators were monks and nuns, including reincarnate lamas, who enjoy considerable social 
capital and spiritual authority in Tibetan society. The lay self-immolators are instantly lionised 
after the event by the Tibetans as ‘heroes’ [དཔའ་བོ་/དཔའ་མོ།] conferring social capital upon them 
posthumously. Tibetans face another contextual factor in the form of the balancing act that they 
have to perform in resisting the intolerable repression, which also forecloses other forms of 
protest and redressal, but also practising nonviolence that Buddhism and the forceful teaching 
of the Dalai Lama demands off them. These historical and socio-political contexts makes self-
immolation a painful, yet suitable form of resistance, facilitating the interpretation of the self-
immolations contained in this article.  
  
Self-immolation as emergency action  
Besides being a form of communication, self-immolation also constitutes the implementation 
of an emergency ‘act’ designed to counteract the perceived threat. It is an act of resistance both 
against China’s general policies and more specifically against its securitizing moves after 
March 2008. In lieu of the destructive power of wars, self-immolation relies upon its shocking 
effect. To the extent that visual securitization has theoretical purchase, self-immolation is 
especially effective in the age of advanced and ubiquitous visual and social media.130     
Fifteen statements by seventeen immolators claimed to be ‘taking action’, which should 
be understood as either protesting the Chinese government, communicating a threatening 
development to the Tibetans or to exhort them towards some defensive actions against the 
threat. Some of the self-immolators say pointedly that they were burning themselves to protest 
Chinese rule. Gudrup wrote, ‘[I]n order to let the world know about the real situation in Tibet, 
we have to radicalize our peaceful action…by lighting up our bodies’. Tenzin Khedup wrote, 
‘For the sake of our Tibetan nation… we choose self-immolation. We want to tell all the 
Tibetan youth, swear to yourself… we have to be united and protect our nationality’. Tamdin 
Thar, a 64-year-old herdsman, who self-immolated on 15 June, 2012, wrote in a short verse: 
‘[To] Protect the Tibetan State/I self-immolate’. Nyangkar Tashi simply wrote, ‘I self-
immolate to protest against the Chinese government!’ They have chosen to self-immolate to 
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jolt the Tibetans into national consciousness, to force the Chinese authorities to make 
concessions or to galvanise international support for the Tibetan cause. While they have been 
successful in strengthening Tibetan identity and unity, they have been less successful in the 
latter two aims. Even the Dalai Lama has questioned the political effectiveness of the self-
immolations.131 Yet, it is an ongoing phenomenon and the efficacy of political movements can 
only be judged in the longue durée.  
    
 
Conclusion 
This article advanced a number of theoretical and empirical arguments. Theoretically, it argued 
that securitization theory is (1) too focused on the intra-unit interaction between securitizing 
elites and audiences; (2) leaves the inter-unit dynamics underdeveloped and (3) fails to 
recognize the securitised ‘other’ as an audience. Taking the existing critiques into account and 
building upon these critical observations, securitization was reconceptualised to recognise that 
securitizing moves (even if unsuccessful) have unpredictable inter-unit consequences 
inasmuch as human collectives can react to their representation as threats. By incorporating the 
‘other’ as an ‘audience’ and exploiting the concepts of inter-discursivity and discursive 
interpenetration, the intra-unit security politics between the securitizing actor and its audience 
is connected to the inter-unit, that is international security, dynamics. This opens up space for 
failed securitizing moves to have international security ramifications, challenging the dominant 
understanding in the literature that only successful securitizations can have international 
‘chain-reactions’. As such, a two-level theoretical framework that takes the unit-level 
interaction between the actor and audience seriously, but also integrates the inter-unit dynamics 
into the framework, is devised. Securitization thus truly becomes a theory of international 
security. 
 The framework developed here is superior to the existing versions of ‘counter-
securitization’. It has broader applicability than Vuori’s conceptualization, which is restricted 
to vertical competitions, while compared to Stritzel and Chang, my framework is equipped to 
explicate why some securitizations provoke counter-securitizations and others do not.  
With this framework, this article demonstrated that the Tibetan self-immolations 
constitute a counter-securitization. This counter-securitization is principally, but not 
exclusively, driven by the acute sense of identity insecurity gripping a large section of the 
resident Tibetan population inside Tibet. The Tibetan resistance is shown to have a security 
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rationale, contrary to the general acceptance in the existing literature that it is driven by 
nationalist emotions.  
The interactive theory developed here has broader applications for China’s conflicted 
relations with other regions like Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Although China’s problems in Tibet, 
Xinjiang and Hong Kong have their own particularities, they share the broad commonality that 
Beijing’s sovereignty and regime-security-minded securitization of the regional issues are met 
with identity-minded local counter-securitizations. Separate articles are necessary, at the least, 
to do justice to each of these regional dynamics. Any takers? 
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